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An important development in cognitive psychology in the past decade has been the 
examination of visual attention during real social interaction. This contrasts traditional 
laboratory studies of attention, including ‘social attention’, in which observers perform tasks 
alone. In this review we show that although the lone-observer method has been central to 
attention research, real-person interaction paradigms have not only uncovered the processes 
that occur during ‘joint attention’ but have also revealed attentional processes previously 
thought not to occur. Furthermore, the examination of some visual attention processes almost 
invariably requires the use of real-person paradigms. Whilst we do not argue for an increase 
in ‘ecological validity’ for its own sake, we do suggest that research using real person 
interaction has greatly benefited the development of visual attention theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
          During the 1930s a movement, developed by a number of naturalists, began in Europe. 
Ethology was concerned with the biological basis of nonhuman animal behaviour and 
examined mechanisms responsible for innate ‘routines’ and ‘patterns’. A major aspect of 
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ethology was an emphasis on the importance of the method used to understand behaviour. 
The proponents of the new field, which emerged from Austria, Germany, and the 
Netherlands, argued that the study of animal behaviour should consider the natural 
environment in which behaviour occurs. This notion explicitly contrasted with the stimulus-
response methods undertaken by the American behaviourists in which models of behaviour 
were generated from laboratory based studies of animals, usually rats and pigeons. Although 
many fundamental aspects of behaviour were derived from the behaviourist approach, the 
field was often criticized for its lack of ecological validity. Whilst behaviourism waned in the 
1950s and 60s, as a result of the so-called cognitive revolution, ethology grew. This 
culminated in the joint awarding of a Nobel prize for three of its leading figures: Konrad 
Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen for largely developing ethology and Karl von Frisch for 
discovering the ‘dance language’ of the bee. Ethology was enormously influential and has 
provided the basis for many areas of behavioural science such as developmental psychology, 
behavioural ecology (i.e., gene selection) and evolutionary psychology. 
            Within the last 10 years a larger consideration of the environment in which behaviour 
occurs has begun to influence another field of psychology, namely visual attention. Attention 
is the process by which some aspects of the environment are prioritised for further processing 
at the expense of other aspects. A number of metaphors have been suggested in an attempt to 
best characterise the way in which this occurs including the attentional spotlight (Broadbent, 
1982; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980) and zoom-lens model (Eriksen & St. James, 1986). 
As with many other cognitive phenomena (e.g., memory), visual cognition has been primarily 
based on experiments in which a single observer performs a required task. Furthermore, this 
lone-observer method has helped to reveal many fundamental aspects of visual cognition 
(e.g., Duncan, 1984; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Posner, 1980; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 
1992; Simons & Rensink, 2005; Tipper, 1985; Watson & Humphreys, 1997). However, a 
number of authors have argued that the single observer method fails to take into account the 
fact that humans are social animals and usually spend some part of each day interacting with 
others. The charge, in other words, is that attention researchers have neglected one important 
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aspect of the ecology in which attention operates; when a person is engaged in social 
interaction.  
             In this paper we discuss the potential importance of real-person interaction paradigms 
in terms of studying visual attention. However, importantly, and unlike many others before 
us, we do not advocate the use of real-world situations and ‘ecological validity’ from a 
principled point of view. Indeed, most would agree that as behavioural scientists our primary 
concern should be with processes and mechanisms rather than where they are studied. 
Instead, we make the point that some fundamental processes associated with some well-
established attention phenomena may need to be revised based on the findings from real-
person interaction studies, and we present inhibition of return as a test case for this. We then 
review other studies showing how real and depicted representations of social stimuli have 
produced fundamentally differing results. We also argue that the understanding of the 
processes associated with one particular broad phenomenon (i.e., ‘joint action’) almost 
invariably requires the use of real-person paradigms.  
Visual attention during real social interaction 
          The importance of examining cognitive processes during social interaction is, of 
course, concerned with the broader question of ecological validity in science; nor is it a new 
one, predating both ethology and psychology. In the early days of the Enlightenment, a group 
calling themselves the ‘everyday chemistry movement’ argued that chemistry should consider 
its everyday settings in addition to the laboratory (see Banaji & Crowder, 1989). Similarly 
during the 1980s proponents of ‘everyday memory’ highlighted the applicability of memory 
research and posed questions relevant to practical settings (e.g., Gruneberg, Morris, & Sykes, 
1978). An influential ecological approach was also applied to visual perception by Gibson 
(e.g., Gibson, 1979). He emphasised the role of motion in perception because most percepts 
are often generated during self-locomotion, where an individual is interacting with the 
environment. More recently, a number of authors have also pointed out that visual perception 
tends to occur in conjunction with action, and paradigms have been developed that examine 
this (see Hommel, 2009; Jeannerod, 1999; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Prinz, 1997). For 
5 
 
instance, Welsh and Pratt (2006) showed that the type of planned action a person makes to a 
visual target will determine the degree to which it is likely to attract attention. The authors 
showed that when a standard keyboard press is required, a task-irrelevant offsetting stimulus 
will reduce the effectiveness with which a new target object captures attention, but not when 
a full reaching response is made. Thus, vision-for-action researchers have argued that vision 
is better understood when its functional significance in the real world is taken into account 
(see also Milner & Goodale, 1995). However, the area that most explicitly advocates real-
world processes is the developing field of cognitive ethology. Kingstone, Smilek, 
Birmingham, Cameron and Bischof (2005), as central proponents of the field, argue that 
traditional attention research is based on two assumptions; that attentional processes are 
stable across a variety of situations and the explanatory power of a process can be maximised 
by reducing all variability in a situation except for the process being examined. The authors 
argue that the assumption of stability means that scientists do not feel obliged to examine 
whether the processes they assess in the laboratory translate to the real world. Kingstone, 
Smilek, and Eastwood (2008) additionally argued that phenomena should ideally be studied 
as they occur in the real-world environment before examining them under the controlled 
situation of the laboratory. As Chisolm, Chapman, Amm, Bischof, and Smilek (2014) stated, 
“By starting at the natural level, one’s subsequent investigations are grounded in cognition 
and performance as it occurs in real life, and hence, through comparison between life and lab, 
one can determine which lab-based findings are likely to scale up to a natural environment 
and which findings are specific to a controlled research environment.” (Chisolm, et al. 2014).  
           That attention can be modulated by social factors has been acknowledged for many 
decades. The early eye tracking studies of Yarbus (1967) showed that a person located in a 
visual scene is particularly well attended. Furthermore, the field of ‘social attention’ has 
become a major area within attention and is based on the premise that attention often takes 
place in a social setting. Although social attention by definition emphasises social context, 
experimental paradigms have not typically assessed attention during real social interactions. 
Experiments usually present participants with schematic representations of social stimuli. For 
instance, an abundance of studies have now demonstrated the importance of eyes in face 
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perception (e.g., Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008b, 2009; Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, 
Leekam, & Benson, 2008; Kuhn & Land, 2006; Kuhn, Tatler, & Cole, 2009; 2002; Walker-
Smith, Gale, & Findlay, 1977).  However, the vast majority of such studies present faces in 
isolation with as little context as possible. Consequently, the face is likely to be already 
attended. Thus, these findings may only demonstrate eye preference because they are the 
most complex or salient aspect of an impoverished pre-selected stimulus. Some authors have 
attempted to improve the ecological validity of social stimuli by using photographs or video 
clips of real world interactions. For instance, Kuhn, et al. (2009) examined visual attention by 
showing a magician performing a magic trick and measuring where in the scene participants 
were most likely to look. Similarly, Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, and Kingstone (2010) 
assessed eye movements when participants were asked to watch videos of students engaging 
in conversation. Although these studies present more realistic social stimuli, their use of 
filmed rather than real social interactions must still question whether the findings accurately 
measure the cognitive processes underlying real world social behaviour. 
          In contrast to purely depicted representations of social scenes, a number of authors 
have begun to examine cognition, and more specifically attention, whilst individuals interact 
with other people. Examining visual cognition when others are present is not in itself a new 
phenomenon. Solomon Asch’s work on conformity is perhaps the best known example. In 
one of his classic experiments, participants were required to match a sample line with one of 
three test lines with respect to length. The central results showed that judgements were 
influenced by what other (confederate) individuals thought, often concurring with their 
selection even when the sample and test lines were markedly different. Although one might 
assume that the perception of the lines themselves was not changed, recent neuroimaging 
work has provided evidence that social influence can modulate perception. Berns, 
Chappelow, Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, and Richards (2005) imaged observers whilst 
they performed a mental rotation task during which they saw the responses of other 
‘participants’ (i.e., confederates). The central results showed that incorrect responses 
resulting from the influence of the group was associated with functional changes in occipital-
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parietal networks responsible for perception. The authors thus argued that perception of the 
stimuli had been modulated by social influence. 
          One of the basic tasks concerning attention and its oculomotor mechanisms is visual 
search, in which an individual searches an environment for a target item (e.g., set of keys). 
Brennan, Chen, Dickinson, Neider and Zelinsky (2008) made the point that many everyday 
situations involve performing this type of task with another individual, such as when a child 
and adult look through a picture book together. A number of studies have begun to examine 
the efficiency of search when an individual has knowledge of where a co-searcher is looking 
(known as gaze transfer). In their experiment, Brennan et al. (2008) asked pairs of 
participants to search displays for a specific letter that would appear amongst distractors. 
Cursors allowed each participant to see where their partner was gazing at any moment during 
the search. Brennan et al. found that that search was almost twice as efficient when a 
participant was able to use another person’s search behaviour, in contrast to searching alone. 
In a follow-up study, Neider, Chen, Dickinson, Brennan and Zelinsky (2010) compared gaze 
and speech transfer when two participants jointly searched for a gunman in a virtual scene 
and were required to agree on the target’s location in order to complete a trial. Results 
showed that RTs were shorter for one participant to locate targets once it had been located by 
their co-actor. 
          Gaze transfer effects have also been shown in applied settings. Litchfield, Ball, 
Donovan, Manning, and Crawford (2010) assessed whether co-searching improved 
identification of pulmonary nodules in chest x-ray inspection amongst novice radiogaphers. 
Results showed this was indeed the case: participants were more efficient in identifying 
nodules when shown the search behaviour of another individual. Furthermore, many authors 
now argue that knowledge of an expert’s search behaviour can be useful in training novices 
(Nalanagula, Greenstein, & Gramopadhye, 2006; Sadasivian, Greenstein, Gramopadhye, & 
Duchowski, 2005). Other examples of gaze transfer include increased fault detection rates 
during aircraft (Sadasivian et al., 2005) and circuitry board inspection (Nalanagula et al., 
2006), and better puzzle problem solving (Velichkovsky, 1995). Moreover, gaze transfer has 
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been shown in a paradigm where transfer occurs by direct observation of another person’s 
gaze (seated opposite) rather than via gaze cursors (e.g., Macdonald & Tatler, 2013). 
Outstanding questions that follow from gaze transfer research are whether it improves search 
efficiency because it represents the collaborative search of another agent, or simply because it 
provides a spatial cue that can be used to guide search behaviour. Evidence for the former 
would require search improvements beyond that conferred by the pseuodorandom movements 
of a nonagent cursor. Relatedly, the mediating mechanisms are not yet understood. For 
instance, gaze cursors may only exert their influence through attentional capture processes 
(e.g., Cole & Kuhn, 2010a; Yantis & Jonides, 1984) or may involve Theory of Mind 
processes. Finally, these studies do differ in terms of the degree to which participants are 
physically interacting with the gazer. For instance, some studies have participants in the same 
room but do not directly interact (e.g., Muller, Helmert, Pannasch, & Velichkovsky, 2013). 
Despite these outstanding questions, the above studies provide clear examples of how real-
person interaction paradigms have benefitted visual attention work. Furthermore, the gaze 
transfer method also demonstrates that real-person paradigms do not just improve ecological 
validity, they also lead to the development of cooperation models.  
Inhibition of return 
         The studies reviewed in the previous section help to reveal aspects of visual attention 
that occur when we interact with others. Indeed, these real-person interaction paradigms are 
explicitly designed to examine the mechanisms associated with social attention. However, 
work carried out using real social interaction may also reveal that some visual attention 
principles need to be revised as a consequence. A case in point concerns one of the most 
widely researched visual attention phenomena, inhibition of return (IOR). IOR, first 
described by Posner and Cohen (1984), refers to the inhibition generated when visuomotor 
resources are repeatedly directed to a spatial location on successive occasions. In other 
words, humans are slower to process a stimulus when it appears at a location recently 
attended. An abundance of work has now examined its various characteristics and the 
mechanisms giving rise to the effect. For instance, IOR impairs the detection and 
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identification of objects (e.g., Pratt & Abrams, 1999) for a period of approximately 3000 ms 
(Samuel & Kat, 2003), and is evident for various response modes including eye saccades and 
limb movements (Abrams & Dobkin, 1994; Klein & McInnes, 1999). IOR is also known to 
‘follow’ objects as they move around the environment as well as being tagged to fixed spatial 
locations (Abrams & Dobkin, 1994; Tipper, Driver, & Weaver, 1991). Finally, it is cross-
modal, having been shown to occur within and between the visual, auditory and tactile 
domains (Mondor, Breau, & Milliken, 1998; Poliakoff, Spence, O’Boyle, McGlone, & Cody, 
2002). 
         One of the key findings from the IOR literature was that the basic phenomenon was 
thought to occur only as a result of peripheral ‘exogenous’ attention-capturing events. Shifts 
of visual attention are often dichotomised as being either exogenous (‘bottom-up’) or 
‘endogenous’ (‘top down’). Whereas the former refers to shifts induced by peripheral and 
task-irrelevant events that ‘capture’ attention automatically, the latter refers to shifts that are 
under volitional control. Endogenous attention is mostly associated with tasks in which an 
observer is presented with a central (e.g., arrow or eye gaze) stimulus that indicates the likely 
position of an upcoming target. (e.g., Friesen, & Kingstone, 1998). It is a shift of attention in 
response to this type of cue that consistently failed to elicit IOR. Thus, if an arrow cue points 
to the right, IOR will not be generated on the right. This contrasts with the robust effect seen 
when attention is shifted by an exogenous peripheral cue. As Weger, Abrams, Law, and Pratt 
(2008) stated, the absence of IOR following central cues assumed “axiomatic status” from the 
early days of IOR work. Indeed, some authors used IOR as an indicator that an exogenous 
attentional shift, as opposed to endogenous, had occurred (Pratt, Hillis, & Gold, 2001; 
Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002). The few studies that have reported IOR induced by centrally 
presented cues (Frischen, Smilek, et al., 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2004; Okamoto-Barth & 
Kawai, 2006) have done so with specific manipulations of the basic paradigm. For example, 
by using particularly long intervals between the initial attentional shift and the subsequent 
target. Furthermore, the fact that only a few studies have shown IOR induced by central cues 
may suggest that many failed to find such an effect and consequently did not submit the work 
for publication. However, it is becoming clear from the dozens of experiments published to 
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date that IOR can be generated robustly and more generically with a central cue if the cue is a 
real individual that interacts with the participant, an effect termed ‘between-participant’ IOR 
(Welsh et al., 2005; 2007) or ‘social’ IOR (Skarratt, Cole, & Kingstone, 2010; Skarratt, Cole, 
& Kuhn, 2012). 
          In the basic social IOR paradigm, two individuals sit opposite each other across a table. 
Built within the table is a flat screen monitor used to present stimuli and record responses. 
Participants take turns (i.e., alternate) to reach out and touch a target that can appear on either  
the left or right of the workspace. Results show that reaction time to respond to a target is 
slowed if a participant reaches to the same location to which their co-actor has just reached. 
For instance, if Participant A is required to respond to the target on their right, Particiant B 
will now be slower to reach to their left (i.e., the same spatial location). The effect does not 
arise during the arm movement itself, as once the motor programming has taken place the 
time to execute the response remains the same in all the critical comparisons. Rather, it is the 
perceptual representation of the target location and/or the preparation of a motoric response 
to it that is inhibited. Although some authors have posited alternative theories to explain the 
basic effect (e.g., action congruency mechanisms, where observing a co-actor reach to their 
right primes an observer to reach to their own right; Ondobaka, Lange, Newman-Norlund., 
Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012), most studies suggest the effect is due to mechanisms that give 
rise to IOR. Specifically, when a co-actor reaches to their left, a corresponding visuomotor 
response to the same spatial location is elicited in the observer. If on the next trial the 
observer is required to reach to that location (i.e., on their right), IOR generated by the 
stimulus will slow their responses.   
         This effect is placed very much within the context of ‘joint action’ work (see next 
section), in which a participant’s behaviour is influenced by the actions of another individual. 
As with the basic (i.e., lone participant) IOR phenomenon, many of its attributes and 
characterisitics have now been uncovered. Within the context of the IOR and central cueing, 
the important finding is that this social IOR effect can be induced when only the first part of a 
partner’s arm movement can be seen and acts, to that end, as a  central cue. For instance, 
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Welsh et al. (2007) had participants wear shutter goggles that occuded a participant’s view of 
their co-actors target appearance and most of their arm reach, ensuring only the initial 50ms 
of their response remained visible. Similarly, Skarratt, et al. (2010) occluded all peripheral 
stimuli with the use of physical barriers  placed between co-actors  that restricted the view of 
each participant to a central aparture. Importantly therefore, this restricted information acted 
similarly to a central cue stimulus used to orient attention in classical IOR studies. However, 
in disagreement with the consensus view that IOR does not typically occur in response to 
central cues, IOR is reliably elicited when the cue is the action of a real person sitting 
opposite. In sum, an effect long thought not to occur, such that it had reached “axiomatic 
status” (e.g., Weger et al., 2008), is robustly induced in a real-person interaction paradigm. 
This illustrates the importance of real social situations for theories of visual attention. 
Direct comparison of real–person and no real-person paradigms 
          There are other cases in which attention processes have been shown to be different 
when real-person interaction paradigms are employed. For instance, people will often avoid 
the eye gaze of another person (Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Henson, 1972) but not the depicted 
image of a stranger (Henderson, Williams, & Falk, 2005; Itier, et al., 2007). Similarly, 
pedestrians are more likely to look where another person is looking when walking behind 
them, as opposed to walking in front (i.e., approaching them; Gallup, Chong, & Couzin, 
2012). Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn, and Kingstone (2011) directly compared eye movements 
during interaction with a real (confederate) person or interaction with the same person that 
appeared via a video screen. The confederate posed as another research participant waiting in 
a room. Perhaps unsurprisingly, results showed that whereas participants often gazed towards 
the confederate presented on the video screen, they rarely did so in person. However, results 
also showed that participants’ level of sociality, as measured by the Autism Quotient 
Inventory (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) correlated with 
the amount of time spent gazing at the live confederate. This more subtle effect was not 
observed in the video condition. Similar conclusions concerning the difference between real 
and artificial social interactions have been drawn from studies examining eye movements in 
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response to social cues in autism (e.g., Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2013; Nation & 
Penny, 2008). Skarratt et al. (2010) also directly compared the effects of using a real human 
versus a depicted human on the social IOR phenomenon described above. In the depicted 
situation a participant performed the alternate reaching task in conjunction with an avatar 
who was a life-sized image of a human participant projected onto a screen opposite. 
Interestingly, results showed that the social IOR phenomenon was found only when 
participants performed with a real person and not with the projected co-actor. These findings 
further illustrate the differences that can be observed between real and depicted 
representations of social interaction.  
         As suggested in an earlier section, other people’s eyes can provide an observer with a 
variety of valuable information, including where their attention is. This is most often 
examined with the gaze cueing paradigm in which participants are shown a central face 
whose eyes and/or head are directed to the left or right (Langton, & Bruce, 1999). A target 
then appears either on the left or right. Results typically show that stimuli are processed more 
rapidly when presented in the gazed-at position. This is taken as evidence that an attentional 
shift has been elicited by the gaze direction. It is often implicitly assumed amongst social 
attention workers (or explicitly, see Wu, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2014) that other people’s 
gaze acts to signal information present in the environment. Indeed, many authors have also 
suggested that attentional orienting in response to gaze following may be adaptive, as it could 
facilitate the detection of potentially threatening stimuli. This has lead to the suggestion that 
gaze has a special status in terms of attentional cueing. However, one of the central and 
somewhat surprising findings from the abundance of gaze cueing work is that central arrow 
cues are equally effective in shifting attention as are eye gaze cues, which challenges the 
notion that social cues have a special status in attentional orienting. However, a recent study 
suggests that the standard gaze cueing method has underestimated the size of the gaze 
following effect. Cole, Smith and Atkinson (2015) repeated the basic procedure but used a 
real person as the cue (see also, Lachat, et al., 2012). As expected, the central results showed 
that the stimulus person shifted an observer’s attention to the gazed-at location. Importantly, 
the effect size was approximately three times larger than that elicited using standard 
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schematic stimuli. Thus the findings suggest that eye gaze is indeed a particularly effective 
attention cue when a real person is used to orient an observer’s attention.  
         The potential importance of using a real person in the gaze cueing paradigm is also 
illustrated with respect to a recent debate concerning gaze following and Theory of Mind. 
Some authors have argued that Theory of Mind mechanisms are activated when an observer’s 
attention is shifted by another person’s gaze. Nuku and Bekkering (2008), for instance, argue 
that the observer infers that the agent is physically able to attend to the target." (Page 340). 
Indeed, a person’s gaze suggests that something is being perceived at the gazed location. As 
Calder et al. (2002) point out, gaze “implies that the person may have some intention or goal 
towards this particular object. In other words, gaze engages the mechanisms involved in the 
attribution of intentions and goals to others…” (Page 1130). However, Langton (2009) has 
argued that the important attribution may be whether the gazer’s perceptual mechanisms are 
working (or not) rather than their mental state. Furthermore, non-agent objects (e.g., a glove) 
that incorporate a pair of eyes but evidently have no mental state are still effective in shifting 
attention to the looked-at direction (e.g., Quadflieg, Mason, & Macrae, 2004). Langton 
(2009) also points out that the typical gaze cueing procedure presents an isolated face that is 
not actually looking at anything. The mentalising account contrasts the most common 
account of gaze cueing in which the effect is said to be due to reflective/bottom-up processes 
mediated by mechanics of eye deviation perception (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Driver, 
Davies, Kidd, Maxwell, Ricciardelli, & Baron-cohen, 1999). Accordingly, attention is said to 
be shifted from the eyes because they deviate towards the looked-at location. In the context of 
the present discussion, one can argue that a paradigm that uses a real person as the inducing 
stimulus is going to be particularly beneficial to a debate concerning mental state attribution. 
One can assume that mechanisms associated with Theory of Mind will be more easily 
invoked when interacting with a real person as opposed to a schematic representation. 
Theories of action co-representation 
        Real person interaction studies have been instrumental in developing theories concerned 
with the co-representation of action and perception. Although a small number of studies have 
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employed the classic lone observer method (e.g., Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass, 2008) there 
is an almost tacit assumption that the mechanisms and processes are best examined when two 
real individuals interact. Perceptuomotor models argue that rather than being separate, action 
and perception share cognitive representations (e.g., Hommel, 2009; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Prinz, 1997). It follows that one can influence the other, an effect 
that has been shown in a number of studies in which observers act alone. For instance, a 
leftward shift of attention will facilitate a left-handed response (e.g., Cole & Kuhn, 2010b). 
Furthermore, orientation judgements about everyday objects are facilitated when the way the 
object is typically used is compatible with the required response (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000). 
A central prediction made by perceptuomotor models is that the observation of an action 
performed by another individual activates the motor system of the observer. Thus, observing 
a manual response can influence one’s own action, thus giving rise to movement congruency 
effects. For instance, Liepelt, et al. (2008) presented photographs of a hand that had a target 
number placed in the middle of the image. Particpants were asked to discriminate the target 
and make a response by raising either their index or middle finger. The critical manipulation 
was that the hand on the photograph also had either its index or middle finger raised. Results 
showed that when the target required the index finger to be raised reponses were faster if the 
depicted hand also had the index finger raised. The same effect occurred for the middle 
finger. Thus a response is facilitated when there is congruency between an observed action 
and the reponse required. However, although such effects can be shown with depicted 
images, theories that link action and perception within a common representation have greatly 
benefited from real-person interaction paradigms. Indeed, ‘joint action’ experiments, in 
which two individuals jointly share a task, have become the major tool in this field. 
         The most notable example is the Social Simon effect (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003). 
In the basic Simon task (Simon, 1969), an individual is required to discriminate a target 
stimlus with a left or right response. The important manipulation is that the target can appear 
either on the left or right side of the display. Although target location is not task relevant 
results show that responses are slower when the target location and response location are not 
compatible. For instance, when the target is on the right and a left response is required. This 
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effect is abolished when particpants perform half of the task in which they are only required 
to respond to one target with one hand (as in a ‘Go-No-Go’ task). However, when this single 
response task is performed with another individiual sitting adjacent who is required to 
respond to the presentation of the other target, the effect is reinstated. The Social Simon 
effect has motivated numerous joint-action studies, the vast majority of which use a real 
person as the co-actor. For instance, Hommel, Colzato, and van den Wildenberg, (2009,  but 
see Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013) showed that the effect is sensitive to the valence 
of the co-actor.  
Issues of ecological validity?  
        Real-person interaction paradigms are often associated with issues of ecological validity 
and social cognition work has been criticised for its lack of ecological validity (e.g., 
Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2009). However, what level of ecological validity is 
sufficient when it is considered? One could argue that paradigms that use images of real faces 
are more ecologically valid than those using schematic faces, but some would argue that real 
faces need to be embedded within a richer context, such as within a scene (Birmingham, 
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008). Movie clips depict the rapid information changes that can 
underlie human interactions more accurately than do static images, but both may lack the 
context that may be critical to observing behaviour in the natural environment. Indeed, even 
studies that attempt to reproduce authentic social interactions, such as those involving 
watching a magician perform magic tricks (Kuhn & Tatler, 2005), or sitting in a waiting 
room (Laidlaw, et al., 2011) are artificial. In those studies, the very act of measuring 
individuals’ eye movements with their full awareness means they are likely to act in a non-
natural way (but see Wu, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2013, who used hidden cameras to record 
eye movements surreptitiously). Ecological validity may be considered a continuum and the 
potential for real social interactions lies at some point on this continuum. For certain 
cognitive processes, such as the use of eye to signal information, there is a strong need for 
real social interaction, but other processes may be less sensitive. It is only by studying 
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behaviour at these different levels that we can fully understand the true nature of social 
cognition.  
             One can also argue that ecological validity is often not a good idea at all. The goal of 
psychology, and indeed science in general, is to generate general models that can explain 
many phenomena. This is often contrasted with paradigm-driven approaches concerned with 
specific phenomena, and specific phenomena is precisely what ecological validity gives the 
experimenter. Furthermore, simplifying mental processes and studying them in isolation 
under well-controlled conditions clearly has its advantages. For example, in their seminal 
work, Heider and Simmel (1944) used simple geometric stimuli to study rather abstract forms 
of social cognition, and demonstrated that people imbue mentalistic characteristics on simple 
geometric shapes. These truly non-ecologically valid stimuli have been immensely useful for 
studying a wide range of social cognitive processes, since it allows researchers to isolate 
some of the key component. Moreover, some behavioural processes only manifest themselves 
under non-ecologically valid conditions. For example, brain damaged patients often have 
very specific cognitive impairments, and can develop strategies that allow them to adapt in 
the real world.  Prosopagnosic patient MS (see Cole, Heywood, Kentridge, Fairholm, & 
Cowey, 2003) is not able to discriminate between a male and female face on any standard 
face recognition test, in which hair is typically removed. However, he is considerabley better 
at such discrimination in the real world where he uses hair style as a guide.   
          Rather than assuming that all experimental designs need to be ecologically valid it may 
be more useful to consider the specific situations under which ecological validity matters, and 
the level of abstraction that is acceptable. Research on gaze cueing has involved a wide range 
of experimental set-ups and stimuli.  Some have used schematic faces (Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998), others images of real faces (Driver et al., 1999) and some have even used real people 
(Cole, et al. 2015). However, what is the appropriate level of abstraction? This is an 
important question because undertaking experiments with a real person as a cue is much more 
complex than simply presenting images of faces on a computer screen. The level of 
abstraction depends on the overall research question. For example, Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, 
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and Davis, (2010) investigated the extent to which gaze cueing is modulated by mental states 
(see above), such as whether the person can see the target or not. The experimenters used a 
standard cueing task, but rather than presenting pictures, they showed videos of a real person. 
Crucially, however, the researchers were interested in how the mental state of seeing 
influenced gaze cueing, and participants were therefore required to believe that the person 
depicted in the video was real. The researchers developed an elaborate deceptive procedure 
that convinced participants that the person was indeed real. According to the authors it was 
essential that participants believed the person was real, and nothing short of a video clip 
would have been sufficient. For the purpose of this research question, the level of abstraction 
was sufficient, and clearly much higher in ecological validity than the standard gaze cueing 
paradigm.  However, as there was no opportunity for a real social interaction, the results may 
not tell us that much about social cognition within real settings.  
Concluding remark 
           The lone-observer method has, for good reason, been central to research on visual 
cognition and has helped uncover some of the fundamental aspects of attention, and cognition 
more generally. In this review we have highlighted how the presence of real people can 
influence a range of attention processes. Clearly, these findings have important 
methodological as well as theoretical implications.  Methodologically, they give weight to the 
argument that social attention research should consider the impact that the use of depictions 
of people in the absence of a real person have on cognitive processes.  However, we would 
not advocate that improvements in ecologically valid are of particular importance; generating 
models of behaviour is the central concern irrespective of the situation. Rather, we argue, and 
have shown, that real-person interaction paradigms can lead to an increase in our 
understanding of attentional processes. One challenge for future experimenters is knowing 
when a real-person paradigm is required. We posit that such paradigms are only needed when 
examining issues concerned with social cognition. 
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